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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces reviewability as a framework for im-
proving the accountability of automated and algorithmic decision-
making (ADM) involving machine learning. We draw on an under-
standing of ADM as a socio-technical process involving both human
and technical elements, beginning before a decision is made and
extending beyond the decision itself. While explanations and other
model-centric mechanisms may assist some accountability con-
cerns, they often provide insufficient information of these broader
ADM processes for regulatory oversight and assessments of le-
gal compliance. Reviewability involves breaking down the ADM
process into technical and organisational elements to provide a
systematic framework for determining the contextually appropriate
record-keeping mechanisms to facilitate meaningful review – both
of individual decisions and of the process as a whole. We argue
that a reviewability framework, drawing on administrative law’s
approach to reviewing human decision-making, offers a practical
way forward towards more a more holistic and legally-relevant
form of accountability for ADM.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen growing calls from governments, reg-
ulators, and civil society for automated and algorithmic decision-
making (ADM) to be more transparent and accountable (e.g. [17, 20,
34, 39, 50, 52]). Many of these have related not only to information
about the algorithms themselves, but also about their development,
deployment, and use. Understanding how ADM is commissioned,
developed, and operated will be increasingly important as it plays
a greater role in society, used by governments, companies, and
other organisations alike. Indeed, ADM is already used to make
decisions about welfare and housing [1], access to credit and finan-
cial services [38], and immigration and employment [41], and is
likely to become increasingly widespread. Information on ADM’s
development and use is crucial for assessing whether decisions have
been made lawfully, for ensuring that systems operate properly,
and for informing those seeking to protect people from arbitrary
or capricious interventions in their lives.
A particular concern is ADM involving machine learning (ML).
Meaningful accountability can be difficult with ML; understanding
how complex ML systems work can be challenging, and commercial
considerations can conceal broader organisational processes [10].
To address this, much research has focused on mechanisms to make
models and other technical aspects of ADM interpretable by or
explainable to humans in some way (e.g. see [4, 32]). However,
information about models and their workings may not be suitable
or relevant for various kinds of accountability, and broader technical
and organisational factors are generally under-considered.
This paper introduces the concept of reviewability as an ap-
proach to improving the accountability of ADM involving ML
(though it is relevant for algorithmic systems in general). This
draws on our previous work on applying English administrative
law–governing public sector decision-making—to ADM [13, 14].
Administrative law has developed iteratively over decades through
judicial review by senior courts, applying to even the most conse-
quential decisions of life and death. Administrative law as a frame-
work and judicial review as an oversight mechanism understand
decision-making as a process beginning before decisions are made
and extending to their consequences and effects. Our previous work
identified points in the ADM process where administrative law’s
principles and requirements could be applied, enabling effective
judicial review of that process as a whole. As a common law juris-
diction with considerable influence on others and which reflects
legal frameworks across democratic countries [51], and drawing
on our previous work, we develop reviewability from English ad-
ministrative law. As such, references to ‘administrative law’ herein
mean English administrative law, unless otherwise stated.
Others have also applied concepts from administrative law (Eng-
lish or otherwise) to ADM in various ways [11, 15, 46, 55, 70, 78].
However, these have generally not viewed ADM as a broad process,
or, as with our previous work, sought to apply legal standards to
public sector ADM. We believe that administrative law’s under-
standing of decision-making as a process is also highly relevant to
accountability of ADM and algorithmic systems more generally –
in private and public sectors. We do not argue that public sector
standards for decision-making should apply to the private sector,
but that a similarly broad approach applied to algorithmic systems—
considering the whole decision-making process to identify points of
review and potential intervention—would benefit accountability of
ADM in any sector. We thus build on our work in this area to move
beyond a narrower public sector focus and develop a systematic,
holistic framework for reviewable ADM as a process applicable
across sectors.
1.1 A systematic framework for holistic review
We set out a holistic understanding of ADM as a broad socio-
technical process, involving both human and technical elements,
beginning with the conception of the system and extending through
to use, consequences, and investigation. As ADM often involves
multiple people working at different stages of the process (together
or separately), we consider these human elements as being organi-
sational in nature. That is, the human elements of ADM—actions
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and decisions of people—generally take place in the context of, are
informed by, and constitute organisational systems and processes.
We note that ADM itself—even understood as a process—operates
not on its own, but as part of a wider socio-technical system.
Breaking down this ADM process into its technical and organi-
sational elements allows us to systematically consider how contex-
tually appropriate record-keeping, logging, and other documentary
mechanisms at each stage of the process can allow for the process
as a whole to be reviewed. This assists with understanding how
and why systems and processes are functioning and how partic-
ular decisions are made, offering opportunities to identify points
of intervention and control across the ADM process (such as in-
terventions by organisations at the point of decision-making to
manage various risks or external interventions by or at the behest
of regulators and others). We focus on ADM involving ML, but the
approach can potentially apply across algorithmic systems.
As such, a reviewability framework potentially offers a useful and
holistic form of transparency to support meaningful accountability
for ADM. And, while producing reviewable processes is already
achievable, there are also numerous research opportunities in this
space. We therefore integrate related research into a reviewability
framework and highlight areas requiring further attention.
In doing so, we make three key contributions: (i) drawing from
the approach to accountable decision-making of well-established le-
gal frameworks to consider ADM as a broad socio-technical process;
(ii) taking a holistic view of that process from system conception
through to consequences and investigation, and (iii) providing a
systematic framework for determining the technical and organisa-
tional record-keeping and logging mechanisms for that process, to
provide contextually appropriate information supporting meaning-
ful accountability for algorithmic systems.
First (§2), we discuss approaches to ADM accountability that
focus narrowly on models (§2.2), arguing that ADM should instead
be understood as a broader socio-technical process to support dif-
ferent forms of accountability (§2.3). Next (§3), we elaborate on our
concept of reviewability as a means of achieving this, describing its
origins in our work on applying administrative law to public sector
ADM (§3.1) and setting out the concept of reviewability, what it
involves, its general applicability, and its potential benefits (§3.2).
We then (§4) set out a systematic framework for ML-driven ADM to
assist in implementing technical and organisational record-keeping
and logging mechanisms across the key stages of that process (§4.1-
4.4). Finally (§5), we discuss some challenges for implementation
and future directions for research. In all, we argue, reviewability can
provide a practical, systematic, legally-grounded approach to pro-
ducing useful transparency, through the recording of contextually
appropriate information that supports meaningful accountability.
2 ACCOUNTABLE ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS
We use automated and algorithmic decision-making (ADM) to
mean decisions about natural or legal persons, their rights, interests,
or entitlements made by other natural or legal persons using au-
tomated processes. These automated processes can either directly
produce a decision or produce information on which a human
decision-maker subsequently bases their decision in whole or in
part. They may also directly entail some subsequent action or pro-
cess, perhaps connecting to other automated systems [66]. These
outcomes may or may not have legal or similarly significant effects
for the subject of the decision. Our use contrasts with the EU’s
General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’), which applies higher
standards only to solely automated decision-making which does
produces such effects [72].
Though discussions of ADM often focus on technical concerns,
ADM in reality involves complex algorithmic systems – socio-technical
"arrangements of people and code" [63]. Technical systems are only
one part of a broader assemblage of human and technical elements.
Many algorithmic systems for decision-making may involve ma-
chine learning (ML) models to produce decisions, produce informa-
tion on which decisions are subsequently made, or manage other
aspects that themselves make decisions. We focus on ADM where
ML models produce either decisions or information upon which
decisions are made.
Increased use of ADM in both public and private sectors has led
to concerns about biases, errors, malfunctions, profiling, data pro-
tection issues, and changing power relations, amongst others [54].
For instance, regulators investigated Apple Card after complaints
that the algorithm was assigning higher credit limits to men than
to women [73]. Amazon’s recruiting algorithm was reportedly shut
down because it was discriminating against women [19]. In Aus-
tralia, an applicant was denied access to information on how au-
tomated rental subsidies were calculated, as the system was third-
party and protected intellectual property [33].
As a result, calls have grown for ADM to better support various
forms of investigation, assessment, and redress. However, much
research on improving the accountability of ADM has focused on
the models that drive decisions, rather than on broader technical
and organisational processes of which models are only one part.
2.1 Accountability in ADM
Our understanding of accountability inADMalignswith Bovens’s
work on accountability [8], as interpreted for algorithmic contexts
by Wieringa [75]. In Bovens’s model, accountability involves an
actor from whom an account is given, a forum to whom it is given,
and a relationship of accountability between them. Also considered
is the nature of the account itself, and any consequences flowing
from that account. For accountability to be meaningful, informa-
tion given by the actor should support effective deliberation and
discussion by the forum and the imposition of any consequences by
the forum on the actor [75] (such as legal remedies or interventions
to correct process malfunction).
Although accountability can be thought of abstractly in general
terms, in practice it is highly contextual – different actors will likely
be accountable for different aspects of the ADM process depending
on what is to be accounted for, and the kinds, levels, and formats
of information needed for a relevant and appropriate account will
depend heavily on the forum to whom it is owed [8, 75]. Bovens sug-
gests that there are at least five kinds of accountability relationship,
depending on the actor and the forum [8]: political accountabil-
ity (to elected representatives and so on), legal accountability (to
courts), administrative accountability (to auditors and regulators),
professional accountability (to internal and external peers), and
social accountability (to civil society and individuals).
Opacity in algorithmic systems. Achieving meaningful accountabil-
ity of ADM is difficult. Commercial considerations and complex
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Type of opacity Cause
Intentional opacity Details of processes concealed for commercial reasons [10, 18]
Illiterate opacity Processes incomprehensible without technological literacy [10, 18]
Intrinsic opacity Incompatibility between machine and human reasoning [10, 18]
Unwitting opacity Unawareness of relevance of broader processes for accountability [§2.1]
Strategic opacity Process information deliberately presented in an inaccessible way [68]
Inadvertent opacity Information unintentionally presented in an inaccessible way [68]
Table 1: Some types of opacity in algorithmic systems.
decision-making process involving ML often entail considerable
opacity. Burrell identifies three forms of algorithmic opacity [10];
while Burrell refers primarily to model opacity, these also relate to
broader ADM processes. That is, the details of proprietary datasets,
models, systems, and processes can be deliberately concealed to
protect commercial interests (what Danaher calls ‘intentional opac-
ity’ [18]). Details of ADM processes may be incomprehensible with-
out relevant technical knowledge (‘illiterate opacity’ [18]). And the
mismatch between the complex, mathematical nature of ML and
human forms of reasoning makes models themselves difficult for
even the technically literate to understand (‘intrinsic opacity’ [18]).
Multiple forms of opacity can combine – it may be that data, models,
systems, and processes are concealed for intellectual property rea-
sons (e.g. [33]), and that, even if they were not, the models would be
incomprehensible. Table 1 presents some of these types of opacity.
ML systems have sometimes been described as a ‘black box’,
which might be a choice made to deliberately obscure [28] (a form
of intentional opacity). However, understanding ADM as a socio-
technical process, we argue that there is another form of opacity –
unwitting opacity, where those responsible for designing, develop-
ing, deploying, and using systems simply don’t think to record rel-
evant organisational aspects of ADM processes (perhaps unaware
of their relevance for meaningful accountability [12]). By imple-
menting technical and organisational record-keeping and logging
mechanisms that allow processes to be holistically interrogated,
intentional and unwitting opacity could be substantially addressed.
However, there are also risks in providing too much informa-
tion. As well as the forms of opacity discussed, Stohl et al identify
two further forms stemming from the ‘transparency paradox’ [68],
where too much visibility actually reduces transparency. That is,
opacity can result from providing too much or the wrong kind of
information, or information presented inaccessibly, whether delib-
erately to obscure (‘strategic opacity’) or because the forum’s needs
haven’t been considered (‘inadvertent opacity’) [68]. To avoid these
forms of opacity, accountable ADM should provide not just any
information about the technical and organisational elements of the
process, but the right kind of information about aspects of the pro-
cess that are relevant to the possible accountability relationships,
presented in the appropriate way for the likely forums.
2.2 Limitations of model-focused mechanisms
However, considerable technical and legal research has focused
on mechanisms to address forms of illiterate and intrinsic opacity
by making models more transparent or understandable in some
way, rather than looking more holistically across ADM processes.
In focusing on model-centric mechanisms, forms of opacity relating
to other aspects of the process, potentially more relevant for ac-
countability, have been under-discussed. This emphasis on models
may itself even contribute to unwitting opacity by obscuring the
need for mechanisms to address other aspects of those processes.
Proposals typically focus either on assisting those responsible for
models to understand their functioning or on providing information
to support other oversight mechanisms. This includes proposals
for transparency of algorithms themselves, making code, model
benchmarks, or other aspects of the model lifecycle available for
scrutiny [10, 23, 45, 50, 56, 57]. Some have argued for equipping the
general public with skills and knowledge to understand howmodels
work [10], or that journalists could reverse engineer algorithms to
inform the public about their workings [21, 22].
An increasing focus of research in recent years has been human
interpretable explanations of the workings of ML models. Some
proposals have seemingly been prompted by academic debate about
the existence, nature, extent, and utility of a so-called ‘right to an
explanation’ [26, 31, 44, 64, 74] in GDPR, which was passed in 2016.
Surveys of the research landscape show a vast number of mecha-
nisms for developing ‘interpretable’ or ‘explainable’ ML systems
have been proposed, seeking to provide explanations and other
interpretable accounts of model behaviour to a range of forums,
many of which have come in the last few years [4, 32].
While such proposals and mechanisms have their place, many
proposals—whether intended to inform the general public, sys-
tem developers, regulators, or others—address models themselves,
rather than broader decision-making processes of which models are
but one element. Though explanations can assist some specific con-
cerns, like model engineering [7], explanations or other approaches
focused on how the model itself works or has reached a particular
outcome may miss much of what is important [75].
2.2.1 Meaningful accountability needs more than models. As ADM
is a socio-technical process, with both human and technical ele-
ments, ‘accountable ADM’ should not just involve making models
themselves explainable or transparent in some way. Models are
only one aspect of ADM and cannot by themselves provide ac-
counts of the process as a whole [66], whether to technical, legal,
or other forums. In practice, other aspects of model development
and related technical elements require consideration [24, 56, 66].
Moreover, technical elements of the process cannot provide suffi-
cient information about its human aspects. Though explanations
can give some information about model functioning, problems with
a process or a decision often originate outside of the model itself: in
the purposes for which it is used, improper assumptions in design
and use, and other human and organisational factors around the
model.
Moreover, particularly with explanations, model-focused ap-
proaches often unduly burden subjects of decisions with under-
standing and challenging them. Equipping people with skills to
understand the models they encounter in their lives (as proposed
by some) may seem attractive to technologists and those in tech-
nology policy, but much of the public are unlikely to have quite as
much interest inML’s inner-workings. Rather, people are concerned
with broader aspects of ADM: the purposes, roles, and outcomes of
decision-making processes as a whole, as it is the whole process
that affects them rather than simply certain technical aspects of
it [26]. More generally, it is not entirely clear why the public should
have to understand and evaluate the models that make decisions
about them, particularly as they will often have little real choice
but to subject themselves to those decisions. Moreover, by focusing
3
on models and holding individuals themselves responsible for un-
derstanding how they work, broader technical and organisational
processes and other systemic issues are obscured, and attention is
diverted from other (perhaps more relevant) factors [2, 26].
While model-focusedmechanisms are an important area of study,
it is therefore important also to consider the broader processes of
which models are only one part [66, 75]. As Ananny and Craw-
ford argue, “rather than privileging a type of accountability that
needs to look inside systems, . . . we [should] instead hold systems
accountable by looking across them” [2], recognising that these are
socio-technical processes with both technical and human elements.
Accountability also must consider algorithmic systems as they are
situated – not just technical features, but how they affect different
people in their contexts of use [36].
2.3 Accountable ADM as a process
Meaningful accountability thus requires a view of the whole
socio-technical process [2, 43, 66, 75], from commissioning of the
system; through design of the model, selection of training data, and
training and testing procedures; to making individual decisions;
and on to the effects of those decisions and any subsequent inves-
tigations. For Ananny and Crawford, as for us, accountability of
these processes “requires not just seeing inside any one component
of an assemblage but understanding how it works as a system” [2].
Understanding ADM as a process allows us to identify points
across that process for review of relevant human and technical
factors by the appropriate forum, and, if necessary, to intervene to
correct, mitigate, or otherwise address (potential) problems. This
depends on targeted record-keeping and logging mechanisms to
provide useful transparency by capturing technical and human
(organisational) elements across the whole process – not necessarily
for those subject to decisions, but to facilitate understanding of the
functioning of the algorithmic system as a whole and to enable
meaningful accounts to and oversight more generally by designers,
developers, deployers, and overseers.
That accountable ML/ADM needs a view beyond technical to
organisational elements has seen growing acceptance in recent
years (e.g., [2, 17, 20, 34, 39, 52, 53, 56, 60, 75]). However, initiatives
aimed at working towards this often lack systematic understandings
either of ML as a broad process or of how to produce useful trans-
parency to support meaningful accountability across that whole
process. Instead, proposed approaches have often been piecemeal
– identifying particular aspects of that process thought to be in
some way problematic. While model-focused approaches support
too narrow a form of accountability, piecemeal transparency of
broader decision-making processes may not bring as much bene-
fit as is hoped. Without a systematic understanding of the ADM
process and how to achieve useful transparency across it, trans-
parency mechanisms for specific aspects of that process won’t
necessarily give the holistic view required, so might not provide
information relevant to a particular account. Moreover, incomplete
records showing a problem could mislead, suggesting that issues
lie in the wrong place.
Conversely, while documentation is important [56], there are
also risks in mechanisms that provide too much information by
essentially recording and disclosing everything indiscriminately.
Privacy and commercial or state surveillance concerns are raised
by recording vast amounts of information on decision-making pro-
cesses. And, again, providing too much information, or providing
it in the wrong way, risks producing its own kinds of strategic or
inadvertent opacity (the ‘transparency paradox’ [68]).
Moreover, as previously discussed, accountability is in practice
highly contextual. Which kind of accountability relationship (po-
litical, legal, administrative, professional, or social) is relevant will
influence the information the actor should provide. Information
useful for regulators overseeing compliance with financial services
regulations might differ from what someone overseeing their own
systems needs to assess compliance with their internal policies,
for instance. What subjects of decisions might find useful may
differ from what courts need to assign liability for harm caused
by decision-making processes. And how information is presented
affects how well it can support meaningful accountability, and will
again vary depending on the nature of the account and to whom
it is owed [68]. Crucially, a meaningful account cannot be given
unless the forum can understand and critically engage with the
subject matter [37, 75].
Supporting accountability through contextually appropriate infor-
mation. Following the above, we argue that ADM processes that
support meaningful accountability require mechanisms for record-
ing and providing contextually appropriate information so as to
provide for useful transparency. That is, accountable ADM is a pro-
cess that requires transparency mechanisms targeted at particular
aspects of that process to provide information which is:
(i) relevant to the accountability relationships involved (i.e. from
and to whom and in what form is an account likely to be owed);
(ii) accurate in that it is correct, complete, and representative;
(iii) proportionate to the level of transparency required (i.e. what
granularity of information and degree of knowledge is likely to be
needed about the operation of the process); and
(iv) comprehensible by those to whom an account is likely to be
owed (i.e. how to present information so as to be understandable).
A way of understanding transparency contextually and holistically
across the ADM process so as to facilitate different forms of ac-
countability as appropriate is therefore necessary. To achieve that,
a more systematic approach to providing useful transparency that
facilitates meaningful accountability is needed, as we now describe.
3 REVEWABILITY
To support meaningful accountability, we argue that ADM pro-
cesses should be designed and developed to be reviewable. Reviewa-
bility as a general concept involves technical and organisational
record-keeping and logging mechanisms that expose the contextu-
ally appropriate information needed to assess algorithmic systems,
their context, and their outputs for legal compliance, whether they
are functioning within expected or desired parameters, or for any
other form of assessment relevant to various accountability rela-
tionships.
In the context of ADM, reviewability seeks to provide a holis-
tic view of the technical and organisational elements involved in
producing an automated decision, considering factors both at de-
sign time and at runtime. The commission, design, deployment,
and use of ADM processes, as well as the consequences of use and
auditing and investigation of those processes are all within scope of
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reviewability (see Fig.1). This approach is derived from English ad-
ministrative law, which is concerned primarily with holding human
decision-making in the public sector to account.
Commissioning Development Operation Investigation
Figure 1: Conceptual view of the reviewability framework.
Contextually appropriate technical and organisational information should
be captured in all stages. Commissioning refers to all that causes the over-
all system to be brought into existence - e.g. its nature and scope, legal basis,
compliance assessment, procurement. Development concerns details regard-
ing system construction, encompassing the design and development of the
technology and the relevant business processes. Operation concerns details
of use, including its application to particular scenarios (inputs), as well as de-
ployment specifics, and details of system behaviour, business workflows, etc.
Investigation broadly concerns the that supporting investigation of the over-
all process(es), including evaluationmetrics, interventions, remediations, etc.
3.1 Administrative law and ADM
Administrative law has developed to contend with the opacity
and complexity of human decision-making, maintaining standards
for even the most consequential decisions of life and death. With a
few exceptions (around discrimination, for instance), administrative
law as a framework and judicial review as a form oversight are
generally not concerned with the merits of decisions themselves.
Rather, they are concerned with the nature, quality, and legality of
the decision-making process, either in a general sense or as it relates
to a particular decision. That is to say, courts are generally not con-
cerned with whether a particular outcome is right, but whether the
process that produced that outcome was correct. In administrative
law, there is no general duty to give reasons (or explanations), but
decision-makers must act in line with long-established principles
of good administration throughout that process.
In administrative law, various aspects of the decision-making
process are considered both discretely and together, allowing prin-
ciples to apply to those aspects to—in theory—ensure good decision-
making. For instance, nominated decision-makers cannot delegate
decisions entirely to someone else, though can take advice into
account. Decision-makers must consider all information relevant
to a decision and cannot consider any irrelevant information; nor
can they consider relevant information that is factually inaccu-
rate. Decision-makers cannot give even the appearance of bias in
making a decision. Decision-makers cannot unlawfully discrimi-
nate on a protected characteristic. Although not giving reasons for
consequential decisions can sometimes be unlawful, reasons given—
unless inadequate—are usually not themselves the basis for finding
that a decision was made unlawfully (though they can give insight
into how a decision-maker approached a decision). Judicial review
instead assesses various aspects of the process for compliance with
administrative law’s principles.
Our previous work considered how administrative law and judi-
cial review can apply to public sector ADM [13]. In doing so, we
drew on administrative law’s view of human decision-making as
a process beginning before the decision and with consequences
that resonate afterwards to show how these principles can apply to
different aspects of ADM. Applying this understanding of decision-
making as a process to ADM and identifying points at which the
law’s principles are relevant potentially allows courts to review
automated decisions made by public bodies without, for the most
part, requiring explanations of the workings of the model itself.
For example, administrative law’s requirement that decision-
makers consider all relevant information but no irrelevant infor-
mation can apply to both model training and to making decisions
using the model [13]. This is particularly problematic for ADM
given, the potential for proxies in ML [58], which can result in
decisions based on factors that are not themselves directly rele-
vant to the decision, and without considering factors that are in
fact relevant [13]. To assess compliance, reviewers do not need
to understand the workings of any technical components – they
would instead consider the selection of factors for the model by
its designer, the selection of training data, the data inputted for a
decision, potentially inferences drawn by the model, and outputs
produced by the model where they are subsequently relied upon
by a human in making a decision.
To reiterate, in this paper we do not seek to apply administrative
law standards to ADM in other sectors. Rather, we draw on and ex-
pand upon our previous work —and administrative law’s approach
to accountability of decision-making — to develop a framework
for accountable ADM, applicable to accountability relationships
of all kinds, in the public sector and elsewhere. This reviewability
framework supports systematic and holistic assessment and review
of ADM processes for compliance with any technical, legal, ethical,
and policy standards and requirements.
3.2 Reviewable ADM
Reviewability of ADM is concerned with exposing the whole
decision-making process, potentially including: specifications and
evaluations by those commissioning systems, decisions by engi-
neers in developing systems; data used to train and test systems;
training and testing procedures themselves; inferences drawn by
the system while making automated decisions; and the fairness, ef-
fects, and lawfulness of those decisions in practice (see §4). As such,
reviewable ADM processes are those that systematically implement
technical and organisational record-keeping and logging mecha-
nisms at all stages of commissioning, development, operation, and
investigation to allow holistic review of the algorithmic system,
its context, and outcomes. While ‘reviewability’ as a high-level
concept has applications in various areas [47], and is relevant for
algorithmic systems in general, it therefore takes an approach to
transparency and accountability of ADM that goes beyond expla-
nations or other mechanisms more narrowly focused on technical
components.
Drawing from administrative law’s approach to identifying fac-
tors to assess at points in the human decision-making process,
reviewability’s systematic view of ADM focuses on points of re-
view and intervention. As §4 elaborates, these exist where people
designing, developing, deploying, and using ADM take some action
or decision relating to the process, or where technical components
process data in some way. At these points, contextually appropriate
information can be recorded about actions, decisions, or processing
undertaken. This offers useful transparency of ADM processes both
at design-time and—crucially—at run-time, providing information
not just on how the algorithmic system was designed, developed,
or intended to operate, but also on how it functions and what kinds
of decisions its produces in practice. By providing information at
5
key points of the ADM process, reviewability assists in assessing
individual decisions and in determining whether the algorithmic
system as a whole is functioning as intended or required.
This view across the whole process is important, given that ac-
countability relationships and thus what it means to be accountable
will differ depending on from and to whom an account is owed.
Various actors at different stages across the same process may need
to account to multiple forums – developers, regulators, courts, sub-
jects of decisions, and so on. Implementing reviewability—with
a systematic evaluation of what is contextually appropriate for
various aspects of the decision-making process—helps ensure that
relevant, accurate, proportionate, and comprehensible information
is available to provide an account. By systematically implementing
targeted technical and organisational record-keeping and logging
mechanisms to enable the provision of contextually appropriate
information about the process as a whole, reviewability thus sup-
ports meaningful accountability relationships between the multiple
actors involved in the ADM process and various relevant forums.
4 A FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEWABLE ADM
Reviewability offers a systematic approach to useful transparency
by breaking down the ADM process into stages—from conception of
the system through to consequences and scrutiny—each consisting
of a number of steps (see Table 2). These steps and stages can be
considered discretely and together , underpinning a framework
for developing and assessing reviewable ADM processes. At each
stage there are opportunities to (i) place limits on ADM and define
(un)desirable behaviour or functionality, (ii) implement contextu-
ally appropriate transparency mechanisms, (iii) review compliance
with those limits and general functioning, and (iv) revise the process
or take other action as required.
Reviewability thus supports a non-linear, iterative, and cyclical
process of review, feedback, and revision, in line with the under-
standing of accountability discussed above and with our view of
ADM as a process involving human and technical elements. Practi-
tioners may move between steps non-linearly, depending on their
role and the situation, as systems are developed, deployed, used,
and revised. Not all steps will occur with each algorithmic system,
and some will be more relevant than others, but at a high level
these steps and stages will be common to many ADM processes.
Others have also discussed ML as a process involving multiple
steps. Lehr and Ohm, for instance, propose two workflows with
eight steps for helping the law understand ML: “playing with the
data” (involving problem definition, data collection, data clean-
ing, summary statistics review, data partitioning, model selection,
model training) and “running model” (involving model deploy-
ment) [43]. Wieringa applies the Software Development Life Cycle
model to divide the process into ‘ex ante’, ‘in media res’, and ‘ex post’
stages [75]. Suresh and Guttang split the model development lifecy-
cle into six phases: data collection, preparation, model development,
evaluation, post-processing, and deployment [69]. The Partnership
on AI also considers ML in stages, from “system design and setup”
through “maintenance” and “feedback” once operational [56]. Guid-
ance from the UK Information Commissioner’s Office and the Alan
Turing Institute group propose several tasks for producing expla-














Table 2: Reviewability overview of amodel-driven ADMpro-
cess. Each step entails record-keeping considerations.
These understandings of ML as a multi-step process are use-
ful, but incomplete. First, while they acknowledge ML as socio-
technical, they primarily focus on model-related issues, thereby
not fully accounting for human and organisational aspects. Second,
they miss some important aspects of ML processes prior to data
collection and following deployment – procurement, impact assess-
ments, consequences of decisions, and audit and assessment of that
process (whether by those responsible or by an external overseer).
Our framework, grounded in administrative law’s approach to ac-
countable human decision-making, provides a more holistic view
by adding two stages: ‘commissioning’ (involving procurement,
problem definition, and impact assessment) and ‘investigation’ (in-
volving audit and disclosure), thereby encompassing more of the
human decisions that are crucial to understanding the system.
Reviewability in practice: a systematic approach. These stages and
steps allow those responsible for ADM processes to consider ac-
countability systematically. First, they should assess from which
actor and to which forum accounts are likely to be owed at each.
Forums, highly contextual, should be considered on a case-by-case
basis when moving through the framework. Accountability of ac-
tors is likely to be dispersed, with obligations on multiple actors
to explain or justify actions or decisions relating to aspects of
the process for which they are responsible [75]. For identifying
relevant actors, Wieringa’s work on applying Bovens’s model to
algorithmic accountability can assist. In particular, Wieringa pro-
poses three generic roles for actors in algorithmic systems [75] –
decision-makers (those responsible for deciding to use an algorith-
mic system and defining its specifications and other fundamental
features), developers (those responsible for specifics of developing
the technical components to the required specification), and users
(those who use the system to produce a decision). We usemanagers
instead of decision-makers, to avoid confusion with actors in the
‘decision-making’ stage using the system to make decisions.
Having considered which actors and forums are relevant at each
stage and step, those responsible for ADM processes should then
consider which technical and organisational record-keeping and
logging mechanisms could provide contextually appropriate infor-
mation for those accountability relationships. We emphasise again
that reviewability does not simply mean indiscriminate record-
keeping at each step. Instead it is about targeted, useful trans-
parency, providing information that is (i) relevant to the account-
ability relationships involved, (ii) accurate, complete, and repre-
sentative, (iii) proportionate to the level of transparency likely to
be required, and (iv) comprehensible by the relevant forums (§2.3).
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By considering each stage systematically in this way, the ADM
process as a whole can be made reviewable, facilitating meaningful
accounts of its operation to those to whom they may be owed.
We now discuss what each stage involves, indicate which actors
are likely to be relevant at each stage and what kind of transparency
mechanisms may be available or relevant at each step. Note we do
not prescribe how to build reviewable systems, or to propose new
technical or organisational solutions. Instead, we present a frame-
work for systematically considering the information necessary for
providing useful transparency, and thereby enabling meaningful
accountability, in the context of a model-driven ADM process. We
also indicate some factors that might warrant consideration.
4.1 Commissioning
Commissioning involves anything relevant to bringing the al-
gorithmic system (and its constituent parts) into existence. At this
stage, managers are the actors likely to be particularly relevant.
4.1.1 Problem definition. ADM exists for a purpose. Records re-
lating to the aims of and rationale for the algorithmic system, giv-
ing insight into the values and norms behind its commissioning,
development, and operation, are therefore relevant to various ac-
countability relationships. Documentation and other records of the
system’s aim, scope, and justification—what it will do, why it is
required, and the role it will play—are worth considering. Various
impact assessment and procurement guidance documents reflect the
need for clear specifications of these aspects (see below). Also likely
relevant is information regarding the decision-making processes
or systems that ADM will subsume or replace. Information from
business analysis or requirements engineering activities, common
for many organisational technology undertakings [42], will often
be pertinent, as will any documents such as minutes from board
meetings, consultancy reports, and so on that involve discussions
or decisions about the nature of the proposed system.
4.1.2 Impact assessment. These involve assessing the potential
implications and risks of an ADM system, and are important mech-
anisms for uncovering and mitigating potential problems. Assess-
ments may encompass a range of concerns, such as legality and
compliance [72], issues of discrimination and equality [49, 59], im-
pacts on fundamental rights [35], ethical issues [16], sustainability
concerns [25], amongst others. Some assessments are legally re-
quired – GDPR, for instance, requires Data Protection Impact Assess-
ments (DPIAs) in various circumstances [72], including where there
is an extensive evaluation of personal aspects that leads to decisions
with significant effects (common for many ADM processes); other
existing (e.g. [48]) and proposed (e.g. [17]) regulatory regimes also
require assessments. Even where assessments are not legally re-
quired, they are good practice, and robust internal (in-organisation)
assessment processes have value [60]. There are many materials on
various topics that can assist assessment undertakings [34, 35, 61].
To facilitate accountability, records should be kept of any such
assessment. These might include details of the actual assessment,
and also the outcomes and any mitigation measures employed as a
result. Other relevant information can include whether assessments
were legally required and whether they led to an interaction with
an oversight body (such as a regulator), as well as information
on who conducted the assessment (an internal process or external
organisation) andwhether any advicewas sought. Plans for ongoing
monitoring and reassessment of the process are also likely to be
relevant to various accountability relationships.
4.1.3 Procurement. In practice, ADM will often involve some kind
of procurement – whether to obtain models or other technical com-
ponents core to decision-making, data for training, technical compo-
nents to support development or deployment, service arrangements
for outsourcing business workflows, external consultancies for risk
assessments, and so on. The nature of any procured product or
service can influence the overall algorithmic system.
The importance of a robust procurement processes for algorith-
mic systems is well-recognised, with a range of guidance regarding
this (e.g. [71, 77]). Records relating to procurement will likely serve
various accountability relationships. This will often include details
of contractual arrangements, tender documents, design specifica-
tions, quality assurance measures, and so on. Details of suppliers,
including any due-diligence performed, may also be relevant. Any
salient characteristics of what is being procured (e.g. test or ac-
ceptance criteria) are often best defined by the managers or doc-
umented as part of arrangements with the supplier. There should
also be suitable mechanisms in place for suppliers to be audited or
compelled to provide information as required (cf. [33]).
Where procurement entails service engagements—e.g. outsourc-
ing of business processes, or engaging cloud or other infrastructure
services—details of the arrangement and terms of service will likely
be important, as will levels-of-service guarantees, agreements for
audit and inspection, etc. In future, third-party providers may adopt
approaches such as service ‘factsheets’ [3] that describe aspects
of their service beyond technical capabilities. Where procurement
relates to technical ‘products’, such as libraries, toolkits, test-kits,
and software packages, details of the version, documentation, de-
veloping organisation, terms of use, availability, usage parameters
or constraints, and licensing arrangements, may also aid review.
4.2 Model building
This stage involves the model development process, including
related system design aspects; in particular, the human decisions
in the model lifecycle. Any ADM process driven by models is in
scope; if a system comprises several models, information on each
model will be required, with further consideration of how the mod-
els interact with one another in practice systemically as part of
deployment. Much past work has focused on models and technical
elements (§2.2), and emerging regulatory frameworks explicitly ref-
erence record-keeping during model development [17]. However,
they often overlook the broader human dimensions of this stage.
In this stage prior to deployment, accountability of different
actors is especially crucial. While developersmay be actively making
decisions in the model build process, the implications of these
decisions should be made clear, with appropriate oversight and
documented approvals by managers.
Fig. 2 demonstrates a typical ML model development lifecycle:
1) data collection, 2) pre-processing, 3) training, and 4) testing. At
each lifecycle step, contextually appropriate records should be kept
of qualitative and quantitative assessments of potential risk factors.
4.2.1 Data collection. Before any model training, data must first be
collected. This involves selecting a population from the world-at-
large and relevant features with which to form a dataset. This can
involve manual input of data, or surveys, or an automated process;
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Figure 2: Model build lifecycle: review process
such as through webpage scraping, or acquiring datasets. Often
those undertaking data collection are separate from those respon-
sible for the remaining model lifecycle; e.g. the collectors might
be from a different institution or organisational unit. Information
on the decisions made as part of data collection is important for
understanding the potential risks, limitations, and implications.
Details of the provenance of data, regarding its lineage and deci-
sions made throughout its lifecycle—creation, collection, collation,
processing, and sharing—is particularly important (both here and
in the subsequent step) [66]. Gebru et al. propose standardised
documentation processes for datasets [30], especially useful for
facilitating communication across those working with datasets.
The datasheet contains questions for the data collector regarding: 1)
motivation, 2) composition, 3) collection process, 4) pre-processing/
cleaning/labelling, 5) uses, 6) distribution, and 7)maintenance. Ques-
tions 4-7 may not be fully answered by data collectors; while some
processing may be done in collection (e.g. extracting text from a
web site by removing markup), subsequent aspects would often
be performed by the model developer with the specific use case in
mind. Similarly, a “data statement” records relevant characteristics
specific to text datasets for natural language processing [6].
The implications of how data is collected, how datasets are con-
structed, and how they relate to the system’s potential risks are
important and should be carefully considered. Additional questions
may be needed to turn this information into actionable insights or
to inform model design decisions. Contextually appropriate infor-
mation relating to such assessments and questions will often need
recording. Importantly, other information beyond that of the data
itself—e.g. relating to other human decisions in data collection or
to alternative options that were dismissed—are often also relevant.
4.2.2 Pre-processing. Pre-processing includes data cleansing (e.g.
outlier detection, handling missing data or data inconsistencies),
data wrangling/transformation, data merging, feature engineering/
construction, data labelling, and feature selection [24, 40]. Human
decisions here could affect the model outcome; for instance, how
missing values are imputed, changes to data structure or format, and
selection of input features. Decisions in choosing and measuring
features and labels can contribute to unintended measurement bias
where they involve imperfect proxies for desired quantities [69].
For instance, using grade point average (GPA) to estimate student
success is a decision that simplifies the latter with a proxy. As such,
useful records would often relate to these various aspects of pre-
processing, including (but not limited to) around which proxies
were selected and why. Datasheets include relevant questions to
facilitate record-keeping for features in the dataset [30]; answers to
questions about these aspects ofmodel building should also consider
the potential system-level implications of decisions. For example,
the gap between the “observed” feature space and the “decision”
space results in a mismeasurement of the target feature, especially
in the presence of historical and structural discrimination; GPA, for
instance, is an imperfect measure of success in high school [29].
4.2.3 Training. In preparation for model training, datasets are of-
ten split into training data, testing data, and (sometimes) validation
data. In practice, some technical aspects of training and testing steps
would be explicitly linked and iteratively performed, but there are
aspects about the model training process that should be explicitly
considered. Relevant information about the selection of training
data (e.g. around ensuring that training data is representative of
the dataset as a whole) and about the training processes should
be recorded, as appropriate. Details about the workflow of model
construction is often also important [66]; this includes the machine
learning approach(es) tried, tested (and perhaps, discarded), rele-
vant aspects of tuning: hyperparameters, predictor variables, and
coefficients (variable weights), and any other factors [56, 62]. For
example, model type and any parameters used in training, such as
pruning methods in decision trees or choice of regularisation coef-
ficient in lasso regressions, can be important to record, along with
the results of the testing phase. These bear consideration as they
provide the means not only to review the model and its process of
creation, but also to enable some degree of model ‘reconstruction’.
4.2.4 Testing. Once a model is trained, it is tested to calculate rele-
vant metrics. This may be iterative, as representation bias of testing
data may be assessed against the population and the model may
be retrained and re-tested to achieve the target metrics. Building
on datasheets, ‘model cards for model reporting’ offer standard-
ised documentation procedures to communicate the performance
characteristics of trained ML models [45]. The model card includes
illustrative examples of questions in 9 categories: 1) Model Details,
2) Intended Use, 3) Factors, e.g. demographic or phenotypic groups,
environmental conditions, technical attributes, 4) Metrics, 5) Evalua-
tion Data, 6) Training Data, 7) Quantitative Analyses, e.g. of fairness,
8) Ethical Considerations, and 9) Caveats and Recommendations.
Model cards include some details on evaluation data and met-
rics [45], including performance measures, but models should be
tested not only on accuracy but also safety, fairness, explainability,
and security. Information relating to testing for these aspects is
highly likely to be relevant to various accountability relationships.
Any testing performed should be presented in the form of “verifiable
claims” with audit trails and explanations of model predictions [9].
‘FactSheets’ have been proposed for ML models offered as a service,
recording testing results to give confidence to the service users on
the model [3]. Similar record-keeping mechanisms may be useful
for model testing in other contexts.
Selection of evaluation (or “success”) metrics is relevant. Often
these are subjective and value-laden. In a well-known example, a US
criminal recidivism model was accused of being racially biased [27],
as, of defendants who ultimately did not reoffend, black people
were more than twice as likely as white people to be classified as
medium or high risk. The model’s developers argued it was fair as,
among defendants with the same risk score, the percentage of white
and black defendants reoffended was broadly the same. Importantly,
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these two definitions of “fairness” are mathematically incompatible
– in practice is it impossible to satisfy both simultaneously [27].
This illustrates the importance of recording how objectives, such
as fairness, are defined, quantified and operationalised, so that they
can be scrutinised and debated.
4.3 Decision-making
This stage concerns all operational aspects of ADM. This in-
cludes details of how the system is deployed and supported, and,
importantly, all aspects leading up to a particular decision being
made, and its consequences [66]. Here,managers and users are most
likely to be relevant, although developers may also be involved, par-
ticularly for the deployment step.
4.3.1 Deployment. This concerns aspects of the process supporting
the operation of the overall ADM system and its constituent parts.
Information regarding deployment can help with understanding
and verifying that appropriate mechanisms and procedures for
supporting and maintaining the system are in place. Note that
this step involves both a design and operational dimension; that
is, building and testing the processes for deployment as well as
supporting the ADM process ‘in production’.
From an organisational perspective, relevant information here
relates to workflows and business processes relating to the algorith-
mic system. This encompasses, for instance, operating procedures,
manuals, details of staff training and procedures relating to actually
making decisions (using the system), as well as to operational sup-
port (maintaining the system). Also potentially relevant are records
regarding provisioning and support of technical components, such
as details of the data and system pipelines [66], including model
integration(s); storage, compute, and networking; scalability and
security plans; logging mechanisms, technical audit procedures,
etc.
The management of the records and other data supporting useful
transparency is another aspect bearing consideration. Details of the
operating procedures, access management and integrity controls,
encryption, and any other regimes in place to ensure that records
and logs are appropriately managed may be relevant.
4.3.2 Use. This step concerns using the ADM system to actually
make decisions (whether the system ‘decides’, or where a human
makes the final decision). As such, it involves information on all
aspects relevant to decisions actually being arrived at.
Records of a model’s inputs and outputs are generally important,
as are details of what and how information and feedback is pre-
sented to users. Parameters and metadata associated with a model’s
use also warrant consideration, as do operational records at a tech-
nical (systems log) level. Mechanisms for model interpretability or
explanation or that otherwise describe how a model operates (see
§2.2) may also be relevant here.
However, this step also involves more than specifics of the
model’s part in the decision. Where decision-making involves hu-
man users of the system, or is otherwise manual, proper documen-
tation arrangements are often required to record what occurs. For
instance, many ADM systems will entail manual data entry, or will
have a ‘human in the loop’ working with the system to produce
decisions – information regarding this will often be pertinent. For
technical processes, logging mechanisms can capture the details
of inputs, outputs, and data processing/computation [66]. Gener-
ally, ‘metadata’—including relevant time stamps, system or process
versioning, records of any exceptional occurrences and operations,
and so on–is also useful, often revealing potential issues.
Note that for effective reviewability, it is essential that this step
involves recording what actually occurs. This is because it will
generally be insufficient to rely on what is supposed to happen –
i.e. according to the the pre-defined workflows, business practices,
and systems specification/documentation – given the propensity
for these to differ from what actually occurs day-to-day.
4.3.3 Consequences. Once a decision is made, it is generally im-
portant to have information of the subsequent and follow-on steps,
such as quality assurance processes (and their outcomes) for a deci-
sion, as well mechanisms that review sets of historical decisions.
This might include checking for model skew, or any inappropriate
discrimination or other behaviour that may be manifesting [67].
Moreover, once a decision is made (and ‘finalised’), generally rel-
evant are records and logs about any actions taken to give effect
to the decision. This includes, for instance, details about how the
decision is communicated, and the triggering of any newworkflows
(e.g. initiating the loan process, assigning a mortgage, and so forth).
Note that cascading consequences can flow from a decision.
Records of these are therefore important for better understanding
the broader impacts and flow-on effects of decisions (see [66]).
4.4 Investigation
The investigation stage includes any oversight or investigatory
activity, either internal (e.g. by compliance teams) or external (e.g.,
regulators and oversight agencies, civil society groups, individu-
als, and so on). Managers are particularly relevant here, though
developers and users may also play a role.
4.4.1 Audit. Auditing processes are important to ensure that the
entire ADM process works as intended. Audits might be conducted
in-house, to evaluate and check that decision-making processes are
apt, that procedures for human elements of the process are suitable
and have been followed, and that technical systems components are
functioning correctly [34, 52]. Audits may also be external, whether
by regulators checking compliance, investigators unpacking what
led to a particular outcome, and so forth [34]. An entity may also
seek to audit third-parties, such as organisations from whom they
procure services, to ensure that arrangements and agreements are
being met. Records of auditing activity facilitate scrutiny, and might
include details of the audit, the basis or other reasons why it was
undertaken, how it is conducted, and any findings. Where an audit
leads to any subsequent actions or remedial response (e.g. system
debugging, penalty actions), details of these should also be recorded.
Given the potential sensitivity of audit data, records should be kept
regarding how, when, why and by whom it was accessed.
4.4.2 Disclosure. Disclosures make information about the ADM
process available to others, and are therefore a key aspect of mean-
ingful accountability to external forums. Organisations should have
processes for making relevant records and logs available when
requested and as contextually appropriate for the accountability
relationships involved. This will generally require the collation and
aggregation of information recorded in previous stages, ensuring
that it is presented appropriately to support critical understanding
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by the forum. Note that, in practice, many organisations appear
ill-prepared for meeting their disclosure obligations [65, 76]
Records about disclosures themselves can also be relevant – both
of the processes for disclosure as well as what was actually released,
how information was compiled, how it was delivered, in what for-
mat, to whom, and when. The basis for disclosure is also relevant –
was it legally required, e.g. as a result of an data access right under
the GDPR [72], an order by a regulator, part of a legal proceeding,
in line with established best practices, or even simply as an organi-
sational choice. And, again, means for obtaining information from
(third-party) suppliers may also require consideration.
5 PRACTICALITIESANDFUTURERESEARCH
When implementing reviewability, we emphasise the impor-
tance of considering which mechanisms might provide useful trans-
parency given the likely accountability relationships; i.e. (i) the
actors from and the forums to whom an account for each stage
of the process will likely be owed, and (ii) what kind of informa-
tion relating to the process might be contextually appropriate for
those relationships. Simply recording everything is not only of-
ten impractical—with vast storage requirements [5, 12]—but could
also result in a form of inadvertent opacity, where those assess-
ing ADM processes (whether internally or externally) have too
much information to sift through to be able to use it effectively (i.e.
the ‘transparency paradox’ [68]). Similarly, simply attempting to
record all aspects without consideration may itself lead to trans-
parency gaps, by virtue of the records appearing unrepresentative,
unwittingly failing to capture particular aspects, and so forth.
Moreover, transparency can be harmful [2]. Recording informa-
tion across a whole ADM process could bring substantial data pro-
tection and privacy risks, particularly if decisions concern people
(especially where they are marginalised or vulnerable). Informa-
tion recorded to facilitate review could potentially be personally
revealing if wrongly disclosed and may be of interest to law en-
forcement agencies or surveillance programmes. To minimise the
risks of harmful privacy breaches and surveillance, the relevance
and proportionality aspects of assessing contextually appropriate
information are crucial considerations.
Given these risks, good record management measures are es-
sential. In practice, this means strong security regimes, potentially
including technical measures (e.g. access controls, encryption, etc.)
and organisational processes, to suitably manage and protect the
information recorded. Details of the controls in place, as well as
accesses and operations over this data, should also be recorded.
There are practical challenges and opportunities for research in this
space; including, for example, how to manage access to which data,
in what circumstances, and for what purposes – particularly given
the range of stakeholders involved and reviewability’s contextual
nature. Similarly, given that this data relates to responsibilities, obli-
gations, liabilities, etc, means for ensuring and verify the integrity
and veracity of the data are important.
The presentation of information should also be considered. As
previously discussed, too much information, or information pre-
sented without considering the forum’s requirements, can produce
inadvertent opacity [68]. Large amounts of data may be involved
and raw records may require transformation to a form facilitating
meaningful accountability. Mechanisms that assist this while being
sensitive to the forum’s needs are an area for further attention.
In this context, developing guidance, best practice, and standards
for record-keeping and accountability more generally can assist.
These can lead to more useful transparency regimes by raising
the bar for organisational practices and increasing levels of consis-
tency. There is scope for tools to assist organisations in identifying
what is contextually appropriate, perhaps by indicating the needs
of particular stakeholders, or particular sectorial considerations.
There is also scope for specific guidance, e.g. around securing and
managing records, appropriate record-keeping formats, standard
forms of disclosure, and so forth. Technical toolkits may also play a
role in facilitating the logging and information to be extracted from
technical components in a common manner [12]. Given that record-
keeping requirements in a tech-context are increasingly backed by
regulation [17, 72], there is a role for oversight bodies in helping
define and shape what reviewability means ‘in practice’.
Finally, we emphasise that reviewability will not solve all prob-
lems with ADM. There are limits to transparency itself as a mech-
anism for supporting accountability [2, 26, 68]. Even reviewable
systems may not capture broader business processes, the wider con-
text of ADM processes, or the situations in which they are embed-
ded. They may not capture interactions with other socio-technical
processes, which form part of wider, complex, interconnected sys-
tems (although other mechanisms, such as decision provenance [66]
could assist here). Nor will they provide information about busi-
ness models or questions of power that come with automation of
decision-making processes. It’s important also to remember that
transparency has temporal limitations (i.e. “things change over
time” [2]), and even contextually appropriate information is always
open to subjective interpretation and contestation [2]. Reviewability
must be understood as both a living and iterative process.
More fundamentally, even useful transparency may not pro-
vide a definitive understanding of how processes function, and
will only go so far without substantive accountability and control
mechanisms. Nevertheless, reviewability works to close a gap, by
potentially providing information on (at least) the assumptions, de-
cisions, and priorities of those responsible for designing, deploying,
and using ADM and their practical effects. As a mechanism for
producing useful transparency across the ADM process, reviewabil-
ity can, we argue, help support other (technical, legal, regulatory)
accountability mechanisms that can make a significant difference.
6 CONCLUSION
Given ADM’s rising prevalence, and risks of potential harm,
methods for facilitating review and oversight are needed. Reviewa-
bility offers a legally-grounded, holistic, systematic, and practical
framework for making algorithmic systems meaningfully account-
able. Through targeted technical and organisational record-keeping
and logging mechanisms, reviewable ADM processes provide con-
textually appropriate information to support review and assessment
both of individual decisions and of the process as a whole.
Reviewability cannot on its own address all potential problems
with ADM; for that, a wider examination of its political economy
and socio-economic context is also needed, as are legal protections
for individuals and groups. However, reviewability provides a way
to gain a better understanding of ADM processes, not only for those
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employing ADM, but also for oversight bodies and those affected
by decisions. Reviewable ADM could therefore potentially be better
assessed for legal compliance and for decision quality, and can
support those addressing more structural factors.
Research is clearly needed on implementation. The specifics of
what record-keeping and logging might be appropriate at each
step of the process, of what kind of information would be useful
to retain, and of how this information can best be presented to
forums to facilitate effective review of the algorithmic system’s
operation depends on the system in question, the domain, and its
purpose. However, as we have shown, existing mechanisms can be
integrated into the reviewability framework, and we have indicated
directions for future work to fill gaps. Although there is work to do,
reviewability provides a practical way of developing meaningfully
accountable ADM processes that can be implemented now.
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